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data from those patients who were not discharged 
by the end timepoint were not included. However, as 
a true population at risk of mortality, these patients 
are representative of the earliest onset of COVID-19. 
Excluding patients who began treatment well into the 
epidemic brings homogeneity to the exposure level and 
treatment. These preliminary data provide an important 
framework to build on as the world moves forward in the 
fight against this pandemic. The timeliness and value of 
this information far outweigh the slight bias stemming 
from the exclusion of patients with incomplete data at 
the end of the study period.
The report by Zhou and colleagues also provides 
data on viral shedding.2 Throat swabs were obtained 
every other day and were PCR positive for a median of 
20·0 days (IQR 16·0–23·0) after onset of symptoms. 
In survivors, median duration of viral shedding was 
20·0 days (17·0–24·0), ranging from 8 to 37 days, but 
the virus was detectable until death in non-survivors. 
These early findings are similar to those reported for the 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle 
East respiratory syndrome coronaviruses,10–12 and we 
await more detailed information on viral load kinetics 
and shedding of SARS coronavirus 2 in various disease 
states. Importantly, PCR positivity does not necessarily 
indicate viable virus, and additional data are needed to 
better understand the infectious period of COVID-19 
and implications for treatment and infection control.
Although there is always the limitation of gener-
alisability in epidemic investigations, this study adds to 
a rapidly growing knowledge base on the clinical course 
and mortality risk of COVID-19. We now have a better 
understanding of the severity of hospitalised COVID-19, 
but more data are needed on treatment options that 
improve survival.
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During the past 3 weeks, new major epidemic foci of 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), some without 
traceable origin, have been identified and are rapidly 
expanding in Europe, North America, Asia, and the Middle 
East, with the first confirmed cases being identified in 
African and Latin American countries. By March 16, 2020, 
the number of cases of COVID-19 outside China had 
increased drastically and the number of affected countries, 
states, or territories reporting infections to WHO was 143.1 
On the basis of ”alarming levels of spread and severity, and 
by the alarming levels of inaction”, on March 11, 2020, 
the Director-General of WHO characterised the COVID-19 
situation as a pandemic.2
The WHO Strategic and Technical Advisory Group 
for Infectious Hazards (STAG-IH) regularly reviews and 
updates its risk assessment of COVID-19 to make recom-
mendations to the WHO health emergencies programme. 
STAG-IH’s most recent formal meeting on March 12, 2020, 
included an update of the global COVID-19 situation and 
an overview of the research priorities established by the 
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WHO Research and Development Blueprint Scientific 
Advisory Group that met on March 2, 2020, in Geneva, 
Switzerland, to prioritise the recommendations of an 
earlier meeting on COVID-19 research held in early 
February, 2020.3 In this Comment, we outline STAG-IH’s 
understanding of control activities with the group’s risk 
assessment and recommendations.
To respond to COVID-19, many countries are using a 
combination of containment and mitigation activities 
with the intention of delaying major surges of patients 
and levelling the demand for hospital beds, while 
protecting the most vulnerable from infection, including 
elderly people and those with comorbidities. Activities to 
accomplish these goals vary and are based on national risk 
assessments that many times include estimated numbers 
of patients requiring hospitalisation and availability of 
hospital beds and ventilation support. Most national 
response strategies include varying levels of contact 
tracing and self-isolation or quarantine; promotion of 
public health measures, including handwashing, respi-
ratory etiquette, and social distancing; preparation of 
health systems for a surge of severely ill patients who 
require isolation, oxygen, and mechanical ventilation; 
strengthening health facility infection prevention and 
control, with special attention to nursing home facilities; 
and postponement or cancellation of large-scale public 
gatherings.
Some lower-income and middle-income countries 
require technical and financial support to successfully 
respond to COVID-19, and many African, Asian, and 
Latin American nations are rapidly developing the 
capacity for PCR testing for COVID-19.
Based on more than 500 genetic sequences submitted to 
GISAID (the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data), 
the virus has not drifted to significant strain difference 
and changes in sequence are minimal. There is no evidence 
to link sequence information with transmissibility or 
virulence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
2 (SARS-CoV-2),1 the virus that causes COVID-19.
SARS-CoV-2, like other emerging high-threat patho-
gens, has infected health-care workers in China4,5 and 
several other countries. To date, however, in China, 
where infection prevention and control was taken 
seriously, nosocomial transmission has not been a 
major amplifier of transmission in this epidemic. 
Epidemiological records in China suggest that up to 
85% of human-to-human transmission has occurred in 
family clusters4 and that 2055 health-care workers have 
become infected, with an absence of major nosocomial 
outbreaks and some supporting evidence that some 
health-care workers acquired infection in their families.4,5 
These findings suggest that close and unprotected 
exposure is required for transmission by direct contact or 
by contact with fomites in the immediate environment 
of those with infection. Continuing reports from outside 
China suggest the same means of transmission to close 
contacts and persons who attended the same social 
events or were in circumscribed areas such as office 
spaces or cruise ships.6,7
Intensified case finding and contact tracing are 
considered crucial by most countries and are being 
undertaken to attempt to locate cases and to stop 
onward transmission. Confirmation of infection at 
present consists of PCR for acute infection, and although 
many serological tests to identify antibodies are being 
developed they require validation with well characterised 
sera before they are reliable for general use.
From studies of viral shedding in patients with mild and 
more severe infections, shedding seems to be greatest 
during the early phase of disease (Myoung-don Oh and 
Gabriel Leung, WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious 
Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public 
Health, LKS Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, China, 
personal communication).8,9 The role, if any, of asymp-
tomatic carriers in transmitting infection is not yet 
completely understood.4 Presymptomatic infec tiousness 
is a concern (Myoung-don Oh and Gabriel Leung, 
personal communication)8,9 and many countries are now 
using 1–2 days of symptom onset as the start day for 
contact identification.
A comprehensive report published by the Chinese 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention on the 
epidemio logical characteristics of 72 314 patients with 
COVID-19 confirmed previous understanding that 
most known infections cause mild disease, with a case 
fatality ratio that ranged from 2·9% in Hubei province 
to 0·4% in the other Chinese provinces.5 This report also 
suggested that elderly people, particularly those older 
than 80 years, and people with comorbidities, such 
as cardiac disease, respiratory disease, and diabetes, 
are at greatest risk of serious disease and death. The 
case definition used in China changed several times as 
COVID-19 progressed, making it difficult to completely 
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characterise the natural history of infection, including 
the mortality ratio.4 Information on mortality and 
contributing factors from outbreak sites in other 
countries varies greatly, and seems to be influenced by 
such factors as age of patients, associated comorbidities, 
availability of isolation facilities for acute care for 
patients who need respiratory support, and surge 
capacity of the health-care system. Indi vi duals in care 
facilities for older people are at particular risk of serious 
disease as shown in the report of a series of deaths in an 
elderly care facility in the USA.10
The pandemic of COVID-19 has clearly entered a new 
stage with rapid spread in countries outside China and 
all members of society must understand and practise 
measures for self-protection and for prevention of 
transmission of infection to others. STAG-IH makes the 
following recommendations.
First, countries need to rapidly and robustly increase 
their preparedness, readiness, and response actions 
based on their national risk assessment and the four 
WHO transmission scenarios11 for countries with no cases, 
first cases, first clusters, and community transmission 
and spread (4Cs).
Second, all countries should consider a combination of 
response measures: case and contact finding; contain-
ment or other measures that aim to delay the onset of 
patient surges where feasible; and measures such as 
public awareness, promotion of personal protective 
hygiene, preparation of health systems for a surge of 
severely ill patients, stronger infection prevention and 
control in health facilities, nursing homes, and long-term 
care facilities, and postponement or cancellation of large-
scale public gatherings.
Third, countries with no or a few first cases of COVID-19 
should consider active surveillance for timely case finding; 
isolate, test, and trace every contact in containment; 
practise social distancing; and ready their health-care 
systems and populations for spread of infection.
Fourth, lower-income and middle-income countries 
that request support from WHO should be fully supported 
technically and financially. Financial support should be 
sought by countries and by WHO, including from the 
World Bank Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility and 
other mechanisms.12
Finally, research gaps about COVID-19 should be 
addressed and are shown in the accompanying panel and 
include some identified by the global community and 
by the Research and Development Blueprint Scientific 
Advisory Group.
The STAG-IH emphasises the importance of the 
continued rapid sharing of data of public health 
importance in medical journals that provide rapid peer 
review and online publication without a paywall. It is 
sharing of information in this way, as well as technical 
collaboration among clinicians, epidemiologists, and 
virologists, that has provided the world with its current 
understanding of COVID-19.
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Panel: Research gaps that need to be addressed for the response to COVID-19
• Fill gaps in understanding of the natural history of infection to better define the period of 
infectiousness and transmissibility; more accurately estimate the reproductive number in 
various outbreak settings and improve understanding the role of asymptomatic infection.
• Comparative analysis of different quarantine strategies and contexts for their 
effectiveness and social acceptability
• Enhance and develop an ethical framework for outbreak response that includes better 
equity for access to interventions for all countries
• Promote the development of point-of-care diagnostic tests
• Determine the best ways to apply knowledge about infection prevention and control 
in health-care settings in resource-constrained countries (including identification of 
optimal personal protective equipment) and in the broader community, specifically to 
understand behaviour among different vulnerable groups
• Support standardised, best evidence-based approach for clinical management and 
better outcomes and implement randomised, controlled trials for therapeutics and 
vaccines as promising agents emerge
• Validation of existing serological tests, including those that have been developed by 
commercial entities, and establishment of biobanks and serum panels of well 
characterised COVID-19 sera to support such efforts
• Complete work on animal models for vaccine and therapeutic research and development
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In September, 2019, Alan Donnelly and Ilona Kickbusch 
called for a chief economist at WHO.1 Such a position, they 
argued, would enable WHO to better advocate for greater 
recognition of, and thus action on, the interdependency 
of health and the economy. We support this proposal: 
recognition of the interdependence of health and the 
economy is vital for WHO to achieve its mandate: “the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health…
without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition”.2 Given this mandate, WHO 
should be more ambitious than the appointment of one 
economist. A more strategic and enlightened approach, 
especially in the aftermath of the coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) pandemic,3 would be for WHO to embrace and 
articulate a feminist economic agenda.
A feminist economic agenda interrogates power 
dynamics and peoples’ relative access to and use of wealth 
and resources. A feminist economic lens that incorporates 
intersectionality must address the power dynamics 
between genders and acknowledge the power relation-
ships between nation states, ethnicities, ages, abilities, 
and other dimensions of diversity, and how they are 
interconnected with gender inequality and the economy.4
A feminist economic approach is consistent with how 
public health is taught and sometimes practised: that 
health, and access to health care, is interdependent not 
only on the economy but also on all other social and 
commercial determinants of health.5,6
WHO has estimated a shortfall of 18 million health 
workers by 2030, largely in low-income and middle-income 
countries. Women comprise more than 70% of the 
global health workforce, but WHO research into the state 
of gender equity in the health workforce has revealed 
systematic gender biases, inequities, and discrimination.7 
A feminist economic approach recognises the systems 
of disadvantage and discrimination that lead to this 
inequality. Minority ethnic status, class, education, 
and sexuality determine who is represented in unpaid 
community health-care worker roles.8 The unpaid and low 
paid labour of women has contributed to profits for private 
health-care providers and saved the bottom line of health 
spending in national budgets: capitalism and patriarchy 
combine to systematically undervalue social reproductive 
labour—ie, unpaid care roles as women’s work.9
Governments’ ability to fund health-care services is 
dictated by their revenue and fiscal policy space. For the 
world’s poorest countries, revenue and fiscal space have 
been largely controlled by the policy advice and loan 
conditionalities of international financial institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. The IMF,10 the World Bank,11 the G7,12 and the 
G2013 have championed gender equality, while the G7 and 
G20 have highlighted the necessity of universal health 
coverage (UHC) and the World Bank aims to support 
pandemic response through its Pandemic Emergency 
Financing Facility. Yet the IMF and the World Bank 
continue to prioritise austerity measures and “private 
sector first” strategies that systematically undermine the 
ability of governments to provide public services and 
achieve UHC.14,15 Neither institution has linked its rhetoric 
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